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Understanding Brand and Dealer Retention in the New Car 
Market: The Moderating Role of Brand Type 
 
Abstract 
Dealers are assumed to contribute positively to brand retention. We argue that the type of brand 
moderates the effect of dealer performance on brand retention. Moreover, dealer retention is 
determined by different drivers for dealers selling different types of brands. To analyze our 
claims empirically, we collected data on brand retention and dealer retention among consumers 
who recently purchased a new car. Our findings show that dealers of prestige and economy 
brands do not contribute to brand retention. Only dealers selling volume brands are in a position 
to improve brand retention rates. A simulation reveals however that the contribution of volume 
dealers to brand retention is rather small in comparison to the impact of brand-related variables 
on brand retention. In line with the notion of brand-dealer fit we also find that the impact of 
dealer extrinsic quality (e.g., dealer showrooms) and dealer payment equity on dealer retention 
differs between prestige, volume, and economy brands. Extrinsic dealer quality affects dealer 
retention most for dealers selling prestige brands and dealer payment equity is the most important 
determinant of retention for dealers selling economy brands.  
 
Key-words: Customer loyalty, distribution channels, customer value 
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Introduction 
In many markets firms sell products or services using intermediaries or dealers. Both the brand 
and the dealer strive to increase their respective retention rates. A consumer’s dealer and brand 
retention decisions are often interrelated, because the brand-retention decision may be dependent 
upon the dealer’s performance (Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros 1999). This especially holds in 
markets, such as the new car market, where dealers are expected to add value to the brand they 
sell.  Most brand manufacturers therefore strive after close ties with dealers to assure sufficient 
levels of dealer performance (e.g., service quality, showroom performance) to enhance brand 
retention rates (Aaker 1994; Anderson and Narus 1995; Chu and Desai 1995; Fites 1996). But 
how important is the dealer really in creating brand loyalty?   
In the loyalty literature many researchers have focused on the dyadic relationships 
between consumers and manufacturers or between consumers and dealers (e.g., Anderson and 
Sullivan 1993; Bolton 1998; Crosby and Stephens 1987; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Mittal and 
Kamakura 2001). The interplay between brand and dealer loyalty has gained only marginal 
attention. A notable exception is the study of Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999). They investigate 
how both dealer satisfaction and brand satisfaction impact both brand and dealer repurchase-
intentions over time. They conclude that consumers’ satisfaction with dealers positively affects 
their brand repurchase intentions, but that this effect declines over time. Contrary to this 
evidence, Punj and Brookes (2002) report that only a very small percentage of consumers 
consider the dealer important in their choice of a new car brand. These opposing results might be 
explained by the fact that Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999) used loyalty intention data instead of 
actual switching behavior to investigate the dealer’s contribution to brand loyalty. This might 
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have led to overestimation of the contribution of the dealer to brand retention (Bolton, Lemon, 
and Verhoef 2004).  
To reconcile these opposing views about the contribution of dealers to brand retention, we 
suggest that the contribution of the dealer to brand retention is dependent upon the type of brand 
being offered (Coughlan et al., 2001). For example, Mercedes buyers consider brand image and 
novelty important, but also the brand’s impact on their social network (Fournier 1998). The 
predominance of the brand is therefore likely to reduce the dealer’s contribution to brand loyalty. 
With less predominant brands, for example Ford, the dealer is likely to have a more prominent 
role in shaping brand loyalty. To date no studies have empirically investigated whether the 
contribution of the dealer to brand loyalty is moderated by brand type. Therefore, our first 
objective is to investigate whether the dealer’s contribution to brand retention is moderated by the 
type of brand the dealer sells. 
The second issue we focus on is how the dealer can influence the consumer’s dealer 
retention decision. Dealers have several instruments at their disposal, such as the quality of the 
services provided, the atmosphere in the showroom and the prices charged, to create value for 
consumers and improve consumers’ dealer loyalty. The effectiveness of each of these instruments 
might vary across different types of brands. Lexus dealers, for instance, mostly have luxurious 
showrooms, while Suzuki dealers often have rather sober showrooms. This suggests that dealers 
create a fit between the type of brand they sell and the instruments they use to increase dealer 
loyalty. Although several studies have investigated how dealers can influence dealer loyalty (e.g., 
DeWulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2000; Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros 1999; Sirohi, 
McLaughlin, and Wittink 1999), no studies have yet considered how the effectiveness of these 
instruments depends on the type of brand that the dealer offers. Therefore, our second objective is 
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to test whether the effect of the dealer’s instruments on dealer retention is moderated by brand 
type. 
 We have structured this article as follows. First, we present our theoretical framework and 
discuss our hypotheses. Subsequently, we discuss our results and use these results to conduct a 
policy simulation. We conclude with a discussion, managerial implications, research limitations, 
and suggestions for future research. 
  
Theoretical Framework 
 
In Figure 1 we display our theoretical framework. We focus on brand retention and dealer 
retention as our dependent variables. The dealer retention decision is based on the unobserved 
dealer value (or utility). This value is construed by consumers’ evaluations of key dealer-related 
variables, such as intrinsic quality, extrinsic quality, dealer payment equity, dealer trust, dealer 
switching costs and prior ties with the dealer. The brand retention decision is based on 
consumers’ subjective value (or utility) of the brand. This value is construed by consumers’ 
evaluations of key brand-related variables, such as intrinsic product quality, extrinsic product 
quality, brand payment equity, brand equity, brand trust, brand switching costs, prior ties with the 
brand. Dealer value can also contribute to brand retention, as the dealer can only be retained 
when the brand is retained. Note that dealer and brand value are not directly measured, but 
function as latent constructs in our model. We will argue that the relationship between dealer and 
brand value is moderated by brand type, that is, the contribution of the dealer to brand loyalty 
varies across brand types. We will also argue that the effects of dealer quality and payment equity 
on dealer retention are moderated by brand type.  
The brand- and dealer-related variables are based on prior work on the antecedents of 
brand loyalty and/or dealer loyalty in relationship marketing, customer equity and the (service) 
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quality literatures (e.g., Bolton 1998; Bolton and Lemon 1999; Bolton, Lemon, and Verhoef 
2004; Chauduri and Holbrook 2001; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Oliver and Winer 1987; Rust, 
Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004; Zeithaml 1988; Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman 1996) and are of 
relevance for brand manufacturers and dealers. We posit that each of the brand- and dealer-
related variables, through the unobserved variables of brand and dealer value, affects brand and 
dealer retention respectively. We do not formulate formal hypotheses on these effects, because 
their influence on loyalty has been widely studied in various industries (e.g., DeWulf, 
Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2000, Sirohi, McLaughlin, and Wittink 1999; Verhoef 2003). 
Instead we focus the moderating effect of brand type on the dealer’s contribution to the 
consumer’s brand retention decision, and the moderating effect of brand type on the effects of 
dealer quality (intrinsic and extrinsic) and dealer payment equity on dealer retention.  
We distinguish between three brand types: prestige brands, volume brands and price or 
economy brands (Desarbo and Manrai 1992; Edmonson 2003a,b; Kirmani, Sood, and Bridges 
1999; Park, Milberg and Lawson 1991). Prestige brands, such as Mercedes, BMW and Lexus, are 
premium priced and have high status. These brands usually have a relatively small market share. 
Prestige brands are purchased to communicate wealth, status and exclusivity (Bagwell and 
Bernheim 1996; Park, Millberg and Lawson, 1991). Volume brands, like Volkswagen and Ford, 
are usually priced near the market average and have relatively high market shares. These brands 
serve the majority of the market. They are not purchased for their status or exclusivity, but for 
reasons such as value-for-money. Finally, economy brands, such as Suzuki, Kia and Hyundai, are 
sold in the low-end segment of the market. These brands are priced below the market average. 
Not surprisingly, the most important reason for consumers to purchase this type of brand is price. 
 An important assumption in our model is that we assume that consumers first decide to be 
(dis)loyal to the brand and subsequently decide to be (dis)loyal to the dealer. There are three 
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reasons underlying this assumption. First, consumers continuously experience the performance of 
the car and only periodically experience the services of the dealer (Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros 
1999). Second, the price paid for a new car stands out as the most obvious cost of owning and 
using a car. Third, consumers tend to focus on the branded product instead of the dealer service. 
This focus is caused by the efforts of most car manufacturers to build a strong brand image and 
identity to position themselves in minds of consumers (Sullivan 1998).  
 
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
 
Hypotheses 
Moderating Effect of Brand Type on the Effect of Dealer Value on Brand Retention 
Most manufacturers operate under the supposition that dealers contribute to brand loyalty, 
because they contribute to the consumer’s consumption experience through their marketing and 
service efforts. In line with this assumption Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999) have shown that 
both car satisfaction and service satisfaction positively affect consumers’ intentions to repurchase 
the car brand, although the size of the effect of service satisfaction is much smaller than the size 
effect of product satisfaction. The channel – and brand equity literature also suggests that dealers 
contribute to brand retention through their value-adding channel activities (Coughlan et al. 2001; 
Keller 1998). 
The contribution of dealers to brand loyalty may however not be as straightforward as the 
satisfaction and marketing channel literatures suggest. In the car market this link could be 
mitigated by three factors. First, improvements in the quality of cars make the dealer’s service 
efforts progressively less important to consumers (Autopolis 2000). Second, the repurchase of a 
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new car is an extended decision process (Ratchford, Lee, and Talukdar 2003). In such a process 
consumers’ remembrance of prior experiences in the service process might decline over time 
(Verhoef, Franses and Hoekstra 2001). Instead, the consumer is more likely to focus on new car-
related attributes (e.g., new designs, innovations) and/or the car’s price at the time of repurchase. 
Third, during the consumption process (i.e., from purchase to repurchase) the contribution of the 
car and dealer to brand loyalty diminishes (Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros 1999). 
An issue that has remained under investigated is that the effect of the dealer on brand 
retention is moderated by brand type. This could explain why the literature has come up with 
mixed results on the contribution of the dealer to brand retention. In particular, we expect the 
dealer’s contribution to be larger for volume brands than for prestige and economy brands. There 
are several reasons underlying this proposition. The marketing channel literature, for example, 
suggests that the dealer’s contribution to brand value, and hence retention, is lower for products 
with higher levels of brand equity (Coughlan et al. 2001). This is consistent with research on 
consumer’s reactions in out-of-stock situations, which shows that consumers with a strong brand 
preference are prepared to switch to another store to obtain their favorite brand (Campo, 
Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 1999). Prestige brands have a stronger brand reputation and higher brand 
equity than volume and economy brands. Most consumers buy prestige brands to advertise their 
wealth and achieve social status (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996; Braun and Wicklund 1989). These 
consumers value brand image, brand novelty, brand uniqueness and the resulting impact of the 
prestige brand on their social network more than consumers buying volume or economy brands. 
The predominance of the prestige brand is therefore likely to reduce the contribution of the dealer 
to brand retention.  
Economy brands have in comparison to prestige and volume brands the lowest brand 
equity or brand image. Following Coughlan et al.’s (2001) argument this means that dealers of 
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economy brands are well positioned to contribute to brand retention. The most important 
rationale for consumers to buy an economy brand is price. This implies that consumers 
purchasing economy brands do not value other sources of differentiation that increase price, such 
as brand image and value adding dealer activities, as much as consumers buying prestige brands. 
As such, the price sensitivity of economy brand buyers limits the opportunities for dealers to 
contribute to brand retention. Consumers purchasing economy brands value price so much that 
they will search extensively for the best deal when buying a new car, independent from the level 
of service provided by the dealer. They might simply switch to another brand or dealer, just 
because that choice offered the best value for money. Together these arguments suggest that a 
dealer’s opportunities to contribute to brand retention are limited for dealers selling economy 
brands. 
Volume brands have a moderate level of brand equity in comparison to prestige and 
economy brands. Thus, there are sufficient opportunities for dealers to contribute to brand 
retention (Coughlan et al. 2001). Dealers of volume brands can also contribute to brand retention 
better than dealers of prestige and economy brands, because consumers in this market segment do 
not focus on a single attribute (like brand image with prestige brands and price with economy 
brands), but on multiple product and service related attributes. This suggests that the dealer’s 
contribution has a more prominent role in shaping brand retention for volume brands than for 
prestige and economy brands. Thus, we hypothesize that:  
 
H1: The effect of dealer value on brand retention is larger for volume brands than for prestige 
brands and economy brands. 
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Moderating Effect of Brand Type on the Effect of Dealer Variables on Dealer Retention 
Besides a moderating effect of brand type on the effect of dealer value on brand retention, we 
also expect that brand type moderates the effect of some dealer variables on dealer retention. We 
have two main underlying rationales for this moderating effect. First, following the brand 
consumption system approach advocated by Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999), consumers will 
consider the dealer as representing the brand. Hence, there should be a fit between the dealer and 
the brand. From a consumer perspective, this brand-dealer fit is defined as the consumers’ 
perception of the consistency between brand attributes and dealer attributes (Aaker and Keller 
1990). The notion of fit has mainly gained attention in the brand extension literature, which has 
shown that this fit-concept is important for the evaluation of brand extensions (Keller and Aaker 
1992; Tauber 1988). In concurrence, brand-dealer fit will be important for consumers’ 
evaluations of dealers, especially for exclusive dealerships. As noted in our discussion on the 
moderating effect of brand type on the contribution of the dealer to brand retention, each brand 
type has different core attributes. Following the notion of brand-dealer fit, we assume that 
consumers aim for consistency between the brand’s core-attributes and the dealers’ core 
attributes. Thus, the effects of dealers’ extrinsic quality, and dealer payment equity on dealer 
retention should be different for the three brand types. A second underlying rationale for the 
moderating effect of brand type concerns the value creating opportunities for a dealer. As most 
cars have a high quality, it becomes more difficult for dealers to provide value to the consumer 
(Autopolis 2000). This is mainly prevalent for the effect of intrinsic dealer quality on dealer 
retention. 
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Intrinsic Dealer Quality 
Intrinsic dealer quality refers to the utilitarian nature of the service provided by dealers (e.g., 
quality of maintenance) and is as such, directly related to the cars’ functional performance. 
Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999) have shown that intrinsic dealer quality positively affects 
consumers’ loyalty to dealers. In line with this finding we assume a positive contribution of 
intrinsic dealer quality to dealer retention. The dealer’s contribution is however likely to be 
different for cars with different levels of intrinsic quality (e.g., engine, durability). When the car 
has a lower (higher) intrinsic quality, the dealer’s intrinsic quality is more (less) important for the 
functional performance of the car. In such instances, the dealer’s intrinsic quality should have a 
larger (smaller) contribution to consumers’ perception of dealer performance. Economy brands 
have, relative to volume and prestige brands, the lowest intrinsic quality level. Thus, economy 
brand dealers have more opportunities to “improve” the functional performance of the car itself. 
This suggests that intrinsic dealer quality should be more important for economy brands than for 
volume and prestige brands. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2:  The positive effect of intrinsic dealer quality on dealer retention is (a) largest for 
economy brands and (b) smallest for prestige brands. 
 
Extrinsic Dealer Quality 
The extrinsic quality provided by dealers relates to the experiential or hedonic side of the dealer 
service (Babin, Dardin, and Griffin 1994). Based on the service quality literature we assume a 
positive contribution of extrinsic dealer quality to dealer retention. High extrinsic quality may 
also stress brand status, by fitting up tasteful and luxury dealer showrooms. This status is most 
important for prestige brands. Therefore, we expect extrinsic dealer quality to contribute most to 
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dealer value for prestige brands. For economy brands, a high extrinsic dealer quality can have 
negative consequences for dealer retention. High extrinsic quality levels may signal that the 
dealer is not cost-efficient, resulting in a misfit between brand and dealer. This may cause 
consumers to feel that they are paying too much for the dealer’s services and lead to 
dissatisfaction (Yin Lam et al. 2004). Hence, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H3:  The positive effect of extrinsic dealer quality on dealer retention is (a) largest for prestige 
brands and (b) smallest for economy brands. 
 
Dealer Payment Equity 
The dealer’s payment equity is defined as consumers’ perceived fairness of the price paid for 
dealers’ products and services (Bolton and Lemon 1999). Although empirical results are mixed, 
the literature generally assumes that payment equity positively affects retention (e.g., Bolton, 
Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Verhoef 2003). A low price level and value-for-money are the core 
attributes of economy brands. Following the notion of brand-dealer fit, dealers of economy 
brands should have high levels of payment equity in order to achieve sufficient consumer loyalty. 
Dealer payment equity seems to be less important for consumers purchasing volume brands 
because price is not the most important attribute for consumers buying volume brands. For 
prestige brand consumers price is even less important because prestige brands focus on status and 
image. Moreover, consumers purchasing prestige brands are less price-sensitive since they are 
willing and able to pay premium prices (Blattberg and Neslin 1990). Hence, it seems unlikely that 
payment equity is very important for prestige brand customers. Based on this reasoning we 
hypothesize that: 
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H4: The positive effect of dealer payment equity on dealer retention is (a) largest for economy 
brands and (b) smallest for prestige brands. 
 
Methodology 
Data Collection  
The Dutch Centre for Vehicle Technology and Information (RDW) randomly provided the 
contact details of 4291 consumers that privately bought a new car within the past two months. 
Each consumer was contacted by telephone and asked to participate in the study. A total of 1640 
consumers were willing to cooperate (response rate = 38.2%). To be eligible for participation in 
the study consumers had to meet two criteria. First, they must have made a repurchase. Thus, we 
excluded first-time purchases from our study. Second, they must have had their car regularly 
serviced and maintained at an official dealer selling that particular car brand. These selection 
criteria resulted in a reduced sample size of 999 consumers willing to cooperate.  
These 999 consumers were interviewed by phone using a standardized questionnaire. In 
answering the questions respondents were asked to primarily focus on the car brand that they 
recently traded-in and the dealer from which this car was bought and at which it was serviced. 
This resulted in a usable sample of 970 respondents (29 incomplete responses were excluded 
from the analysis). In the estimation of our econometric model, we also excluded 15 respondents 
who moved to another city or village and provided this as their primary reason for dealer 
switching. The key sample characteristics, shown in Table 1, are in line with Dutch market 
studies on the characteristics of new car buyers. A routine check for respondent bias indicated 
that no significant differences existed in the mean responses on any construct across respondents 
with different socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., gender, age and education).  
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-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
 
Measure Development and Pre-testing 
We established a dichotomous variable called brand retention by comparing the brand of the 
consumer’s newly repurchased car with the brand of the car that the consumer previously owned. 
These brand switching details were obtained both from the RDW database and cross-checked by 
means of the survey data. Likewise, we established a dichotomous variable labeled dealer loyalty 
by comparing the dealer from which consumers purchased their new car with the dealer from 
which the previously owned car was purchased and serviced. The dealer switching behavior was 
obtained from the survey data. 
To measure the consumer’s perceptions with regard to the brand and dealer-related 
variables we generated a pool of fifty-five items for measuring each of the constructs using 
literature search and interviews with academics and consumers. Pretests of these items were 
performed in three phases: (1) face-to-face interviews with 4 academics, (2) interviews with 4 
industry experts and; (3) a test of substantive validity involving 4 consumers. By the end of pre-
testing participants reported no concerns and the questionnaire was therefore ready for final 
administration.  
We measured the brand and dealer-related variables using multi-item scales (see 
Appendix A). We used 3 and 11 items respectively to measure the consumer’s perception of 
intrinsic brand and dealer quality and 11 and 5 items respectively to measure consumer perceived 
extrinsic brand and dealer quality. These items are based on Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999) 
and Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985). We measured consumer perceived brand and 
dealer payment equity using 4 and 7 items respectively. These items are based on Bolton and 
Lemon (1999), Maddox (1982), Oliver and Swan (1989) and Lichtenstein and Bearden (1989). 
 15
We used 2 items to measure the consumer’s trust in the brand and in the dealer. These items are 
based on Chauduri and Holbrook (2001). We developed 4 items to measure consumer perceived 
brand equity by drawing on Keller (1993). Finally, we measured consumer’s perceived brand and 
dealer switching costs, each with 2 items, based on Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Kumar, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995). Prior ties with the brand or dealer is an indicator of revealed 
loyalty in the past and/or inertia (Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004). The prior ties with the car 
brand was measured by asking if the respondent had purchased the same car brand before (i.e., 
before the purchase of the car recently traded in). A similar type of question was asked to 
measure the respondent’s prior ties with the dealer. This resulted in a dichotomous variable in 
which a 1 indicates prior ties and a 0 the absence of prior ties. 
 
Assessment of Psychometric Properties  
To purify the list of items of the multi-item scales we computed inter-item correlations and 
corrected item-to-total correlations for each item, taking one subscale at a time, to obtain 
unidimensionality (Steenkamp and Van Trijp 1991). We eliminated items for which these 
correlations were not significant (p<0.01). Principal axis factoring explored the unidimensionality 
of each purified scale using an eigenvalue of 1.0 and factor loadings of 0.40 as the cut-off points. 
Computing reliability coefficients explored the reliability of each purified, unidimensional scale. 
Where the coefficient alpha was smaller than 0.7, we removed the item with the lowest corrected 
item-to-total correlation until meeting the 0.7 level (Nunnally 1978). This procedure resulted in a 
reduced set of 49 items. The deleted items are marked in appendix A. 
To further refine the measures we used the reduced set of items to estimate two CFA-
models using ML-estimation in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). The first CFA model 
included the items pertaining to the brand-related variables. The second model included the items 
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pertaining to the dealer-related variables. The modification indices showed that the fit of both 
models could be improved by eliminating two items respectively. The deleted items are marked 
in the appendix. The results of the re-specified models, reported in tables 2 and 3, indicate that 
the absolute (i.e., GFI and NFI) and relative (i.e., NNFI, CFI and IFI) fit indices are at or above 
the threshold value of 0.90 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Gerbing and Anderson 1992). The 
parsimonious fit measures (i.e., χ2/df) are 3.02 and 3.42 respectively, well within the acceptable 
range of 2 to 5 (Marsh and Hovecar 1985). The RMSEAs are below the recommended 0.08 level 
(Browne and Cudeck 1993). In both models the composite reliabilities of the scales exceed the 
0.70 threshold for acceptable reliability (Bagozzi and Yi 1988) and the majority of the average 
values for extracted variance exceed the threshold level of 0.50. Together these results indicate 
that the scales are internally consistent. Convergent validity was indicated by the fact that in each 
model all items significantly load (t>2.0) on their corresponding latent construct structure 
(Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991).  
 
-- Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here -- 
 
We assessed the discriminant validity across the subscales by estimating two-factor 
models for each possible pair of subscales twice: once constraining the correlation between the 
latent variables to unity, and once freeing the parameter. We used a chi-square difference test to 
assess whether the chi-square of the unconstrained model was significantly lower (p<0.05) than 
that of the constrained model as evidence of discriminant validity. To further assess discriminant 
validity we examined the 95% confidence intervals around all pair-wise factor correlations 
(Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991). The results evidenced discriminant validity because none of the 
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confidence intervals encompassed the value of 1.0. Table 4 shows the means, standard deviations 
and inter-construct correlations. 
 
-- Insert Table 4 about here -- 
 
Together the results of the tests indicated a sufficient degree of unidimensionality, reliability and 
validity. Based on this evidence, we formed the constructs by averaging the responses to each. 
 
Classification of Brand Types  
For the classification of the brands into the three brand types we asked a separate sample of 
randomly selected Dutch consumers to classify twenty-eight brands as either economy, volume or 
prestige brands. Each brand was classified by 62 consumers. The twenty-eight brands in this 
classification study were the brands that the respondents in the survey mentioned as the brands of 
their traded-in car.  
 To assess the reliability of the consumers’ judgments we used the proportional reduction 
in loss (PRL) approach (Rust and Cooil 1994). The results in appendix B show that the PRL-
reliability measure is 0.99. This indicates that the assignment of brands to the different brand 
types is reliable. The consumers agreed that Daewoo, Daihatsu, Hyundai, Kia, Seat, Skoda, 
Subaru and Suzuki are economy brands. Citroen, Fiat, Ford, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, 
Opel, Peugeot, Renault, Toyota, and Volkswagen are considered volume bands. Alfa Romeo, 
Audi, BMW, Chrysler, Lancia, Mercedes, Rover, and Volvo are judged as prestige brands. The 
validity of this classification was assessed by comparing our classification with the official 
classification used by the Dutch Dealer Association (NDA). The two classifications were quite 
similar, which confirmed the validity of our brand type classification.  
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Nested Logit Model 
As already mentioned we assume a hierarchy in consumers’ brand retention and dealer retention 
decisions. At the same time we assume that the dealer can increase brand retention. A model that 
enables us to model both the hierarchical nature of consumers’ retention decisions and the 
contribution of the dealer to brand retention is the nested logit model (Franses and Paap 2001; 
Greene 1997; McFadden 1981). The structure of this model is discussed below. 
 
Dealer Retention 
We estimate the probability that the consumer is loyal to the dealer, conditional on being loyal to 
the brand, using a standard binominal logit model (Guadagni and Little 1983). The dealer 
retention decision (DRET) of consumer i depends on the consumer’s perception of the dealer-
related variables that drive dealer retention: Dealer Intrinsic Quality (DIQ), Dealer Extrinsic 
Quality (DEQ), Dealer Payment Equity (DPE), Dealer Trust (DT), Dealer Switching Costs 
(DSC), and Prior Ties with the Dealer (DPT). We allow for the hypothesized moderating effects 
of brand type by estimating brand type specific parameters for these variables. This is 
accomplished by including an interaction between the brand type dummies for each brand type 
(dummy prestige brand (DPRB), dummy volume brand (DVOB), and dummy economy brand 
(DECB)) and the variables that are moderated by brand type. We also include brand type 
dummies as main effects. The dealer retention probability, conditional on the consumer being 
brand loyal (BRET=1), is mathematically formulated as: 
(1) )0()1|( *, >== idii UPBRETDRETP  
(2) * id,U  = Ud,i+εd,i 
(3)  Ud,i = β0+β1pDPRB*DIQi +β1vDVOB*DIQi +β1eDECB*DIQi +β2pDPRB*DEQi 
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  +β2vDVOB*DEQi + β2eDECB*DEQi + β3pDPRB*DPEi + β3vDVOB*DPEi 
  +β3eDECB*DPEi + β4DTi + β5DSCi + β6DPTi + β7DPRBi + β8DVOBi 
 
*
id,U  is usually interpreted as the latent utility that consumer i associates with the dealer. The 
consumer then decides to stay loyal when this latent utility is positive: 0U* id, > . When a Gumbel 
distribution is assumed for the unobserved component in this latent utility, εd,i, the familiar Logit 
model results, so 
(4) 
)exp(1
)exp(
)1|(
,
,
id
id
ii U
U
BRETDRETP +==   
 
Brand Retention 
In the nested logit framework the brand retention probability depends upon the expected utility 
obtained from the dealer. This expected utility reflects the contribution of the dealer to brand 
retention. This is usually referred to as the inclusive value component. Depending on the 
application this value has a specific content. For example, researchers modeling category 
purchase incidence and brand loyalty refer to this value as category value (Bucklin and Lattin 
1991). Similarly, we refer to this inclusive value as dealer value (DV). Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985) show that the natural logarithm of the denominator of the dealer retention probability in 
equation (3) equals DV. We allow for the hypothesized moderating effect of brand type on dealer 
value by estimating brand type specific parameters for these variables by including interactions 
between the brand type dummies and dealer value. To model the brand retention decision of 
consumer i, we use the binomial logit model with dealer value and the brand-related variables 
(Brand Intrinsic Quality (BIQ), Brand Extrinsic Quality (BEQ), Brand Payment Equity (BPE), 
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Brand Trust (BT), Brand Equity (BE), Brand Switching Costs (BSC), and Prior Ties with the 
Brand (BPT)) as predictors of brand retention. The mathematical formulation is as follows: 
(5) )0()1( *, >== ibi UPBRETP  
(6) * ib,U = Ub,i + εb,i 
(7) Ub,i  = θ0 + θ1BIQi + θ2BEQi + θ3BPEi + θ4BTi + θ5BEi + θ6BSCi + θ7BPTi +θ8DPRBi 
+θ9DVOBi + τ0pDPRB*DVi + τ0vDVOB*DVi + τ0eDECB*DVi 
 (8) ))exp(1log( ,idi UDV +=  
 
Similar to the dealer retention model, * ib,U  is the consumers’ unobserved latent utility of the 
brand and εb,i is a random error term for the brand retention equation.  
Estimation Procedure 
The nested logit model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method. The likelihood for 
the nested logit model is given by (Franses and Paap 2001; Greene 1997): 
(9) ∑
= ⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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==−
−+==
=+=−−
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n
i
ii
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iiii
BRETDRETP
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BRETPBRETBRETPBRET
LnL
1 ))1|1(1(
*)1()1|1(*
*)1(*))1(1(*)1(
ln  
 
The differences between the brand type specific coefficients are tested by means of Wald-
coefficient tests.  
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Empirical Results 
Retention rates 
Of the consumers within our sample: (1) 47.3% is brand loyal and dealer loyal; (2) 13.3% is 
brand loyal and dealer disloyal; (3) 36.0% is brand disloyal and dealer disloyal; and (4) 3.4% is 
brand disloyal and dealer loyal. The latter percentage reflects the distribution structure in the 
Netherlands in which the vast majority of car brands are distributed through exclusive 
dealerships. The occurrence of multi-brand dealerships is so uncommon that we decided to 
exclude consumers disloyal to the brand and loyal to the dealer from the estimation of our nested 
logit model. The final sample for the estimation of our model consisted of 922 consumers. 
 
Nested Logit Model Results 
The parameter estimates of equations (3) and (7) are reported in Table 5.4 In the brand retention 
equation, we are particularly interested in how the effect of dealer value on brand retention 
differs between the three brand types. Our results reveal a non-significant effect of dealer value 
for prestige brands, a positive effect for volume brands (τ0v=0.36; p=0.00) and a non-significant 
effect of dealer value for economy brands. Based on a Wald test we do not accept the assumption 
of no differences in the coefficients of the brand types (p=0.03). Pair-wise coefficient tests reveal 
a significant difference between the prestige brands and the volume brands (p=0.01), but no 
significant differences between the volume brands and economy brands (p=0.26) and the prestige 
brands and the economy brands (p=0.12). Thus, our results provide partial support for H1, which 
                                                   
4 We have, as previously explained, assumed that consumers first decide on brand retention and subsequently on 
dealer retention, which is reflected in our specification of the nested logit model. However, we also estimated a 
nested logit model where consumers first decide on dealer retention and subsequently on brand retention. This model 
has however a worse fit than the presented model. This supports our assumption on the precedence of retention 
decisions. 
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states that the positive contribution of the dealer to brand retention is larger for volume brands 
than for prestige brands and economy brands.  However, the finding that the contribution of the 
dealer to brand retention is insignificant for prestige and economy brands is of interest. 
For brand retention, we find the expected positive effects of brand extrinsic quality 
(θ2=0.59; p<0.01), brand payment equity (θ3=0.26; p<0.05), brand equity (θ4=0.23; p<0.01), 
brand trust (θ5=0.43; p<0.01), brand switching costs (θ6=0.21; p<0.01) and prior brand ties 
(θ7=0.58; p<0.01). We find no significant effect of brand intrinsic quality on brand retention. The 
estimation results do not show significant effects of the prestige brand dummy and the volume 
brand dummy5. 
In the dealer retention equation, the results show that dealer intrinsic quality has a 
negative effect (β1p=-3.18; p<0.05) for prestige brands, while it has no significant effects for both 
volume brands (p=0.80) and economy brands (p=0.37). These results are in line with our 
hypothesis that the effect is smallest for prestige brands. The estimated negative effect for 
prestige brands is counterintuitive. Perhaps dealers of prestige brands should not focus on 
intrinsic quality, as consumers in this market segment demand the highest possible service level. 
Intrinsic quality is at best a point-of-parity and not a competitive advantage. Dealers presenting 
themselves as having high intrinsic quality might actually signal the lack of a real competitive 
advantage. In combination with an insignificant difference between the volume brand and the 
economy brand, the estimation results provide partial support for H2. 
Dealer extrinsic quality has a positive effect (β2p=3.17; p=0.09) on dealer retention for 
prestige brands and a negative effect for economy brands (β2e= -0.97; p=0.04). No significant 
                                                   
5 We also estimated a model without the moderating effects of brand type. In this model we found a significant main 
effect of dealer value on brand retention. The coefficients and significance levels of the included predictors of both 
brand- and dealer retention were robust with respect to this change in specification. 
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effect is found for volume brands. A Wald test reveals that the three coefficients significantly 
differ from each other (p=0.02). Pair-wise Wald tests reveal that the coefficients for prestige 
brands and volume brands are significantly larger than the coefficient for economy brands 
(p=0.02; p=0.02) and that the coefficient for prestige brands is also significant larger than the one 
for volume brands at a 6% significance level. Thus, we find support for H3a, albeit at a 
significance level of 6%, and also for H3b stating that the positive effect of extrinsic dealer quality 
on dealer retention is respectively largest for prestige brands and smallest for economy brands.  
With respect to dealer payment equity we find a negative effect for prestige brands (β3p=-
1.14; p=0.08) and positive effects for volume brands (β3v=0.34; p=0.06) and economy brands 
(β3e=0.90; p=0.05). Again, we have an unexpected sign for the effect of payment equity for 
prestige brands. Although payment equity is unlikely to be a point-of-parity, low prices might 
still signal poor performance on other, more important, attributes. Moreover, customers having 
high payment equity scores might be more price sensitive, which leads to more defection (Bolton 
and Lemon 1999; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2001). A Wald test reveals unequal 
coefficients for the three brand types (p=0.03). Additional pair-wise Wald tests show differences 
in coefficients between prestige brands and volume brands (p=0.01) and between prestige brands 
and economy brands (p=0.00). No significant difference is found between the coefficients of 
volume brands and economy brands. Thus, we find support for H4b, stating that the positive effect 
of perceived dealer payment equity on dealer retention is smallest for prestige brands. No support 
is found for H4a, which proposed that the positive effect of perceived dealer payment equity on 
dealer retention is largest for economy brands. 
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For the other antecedents of dealer retention, we find positive effects of dealer trust 
(β4=0.64; p<0.01), dealer switching costs (β5=0.16; p<0.05) and prior ties with the dealer 
(β6=0.46; p<0.05).  
  
 
-- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
 
Policy Simulation 
One of the crucial issues in this study relates to the contribution of dealers to brand retention. Our 
empirical results show that only dealers of volume brands significantly contribute to brand 
retention. This implies that manufacturers of volume brands can enhance brand retention by 
improving consumers’ perceptions of brand-related variables, but also by improving consumers’ 
perceptions of the dealer-related variables using dealer incentive programs. However, when 
making decisions on the allocation of retention budgets it is important to have knowledge about 
the size of the contribution of both the brand and the dealer-related variables to brand retention. 
To provide this knowledge we have simulated the effect of changes in two important brand 
retention variables (i.e., brand payment equity and brand trust) and in two important dealer-value 
determinants (i.e., dealer payment equity and dealer trust) on brand retention. The results of this 
simulation are shown in Figure 2. The results reveal that changes in brand trust and brand 
payment equity have a strong positive effect on the brand retention probability. Increases in 
dealer payment equity or dealer trust only have a marginal positive impact on this probability.6 
Thus, although dealers of volume brands contribute to brand retention, the size of the impact of 
                                                   
6 Given the nonlinearity of the Logit function, one expects nonlinear curves in this graph. Indeed, the curves are 
nonlinear, but we display a part of the Logit function that is almost linear. 
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the dealer-related variables is small when compared to the effect of the brand-related variables. 
We have only reported this analysis for volume brands, as the effects of dealer value turned out to 
be insignificant for economy and prestige brands.  
 
-- Insert Figure 2 about here -- 
 
Discussion and Implications 
In this study we have simultaneously investigated how brand and dealer-related variables affect 
consumers’ brand and dealer loyalty decisions. In doing so, we have extended Mittal, Kumar, and 
Tsiros’ (1999) study from a theoretical perspective by looking at the moderating role of brand 
type and from an empirical perspective by investigating actual switching behavior instead of 
purchase intentions. From a modeling standpoint, we have used the nested logit model to study 
the interplay between manufacturers and dealers in creating brand loyalty, which to date had been 
primarily used in scanner panel data applications (e.g., Bucklin and Lattin 1991; Bucklin and 
Gupta 1992). 
Discussion 
The results of our study are summarized in Table 6. This overview reveals that we found full 
support for four hypotheses, partial support for one hypothesis, and no support for two 
hypotheses. The conclusions that can be drawn from these results are discussed below. 
 
-- Insert Table 6 about here -- 
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The first conclusion is that the contribution of a dealer to brand retention is dependent on 
the type of brand offered by the dealer. Only dealers selling volume brands have a significant 
positive impact on brand retention. Dealers selling prestige brands and economy brands seem to 
be in a position where they cannot contribute to brand retention. The lack of a contribution of 
prestige brand dealers is consistent with the expectations from the marketing channel literature 
that the contribution of dealers to brand value, and hence retention, is smaller for high equity 
brands (e.g. Coughlan et al. 2001). That dealers of economy brands, with on average low brand 
equity, fail to contribute to brand retention is not noted in the marketing channel literature, but 
can be explained by the price sensitivity of the buyers of economy brands. The contribution of 
volume brand dealers to brand retention suggests that dealers selling brands with an average 
equity can affect consumers’ brand retention decisions most. Our policy simulation reveals 
however that the size of this contribution is rather small. From a manufacturer’s perspective this 
means that the returns of direct investments in the brand are much higher than indirect 
investments in dealers through all kinds of dealer programs. Overall, we conclude that the 
contribution of the dealer to brand retention in the new car market should not be exaggerated. 
 A second conclusion is that the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic dealer quality and dealer 
payment equity on dealer retention varies for dealers selling different brand types. We found that 
extrinsic dealer quality is important for prestige brand dealer retention, but not for dealers selling 
volume brands. High extrinsic quality even has a detrimental effect on dealer retention for 
economy brands. Dealer payment equity is less important for prestige brand dealer retention and 
of equal importance for consumers’ loyalty to dealers selling volume and economy brands. We 
used the notion of brand-dealer fit to explain these findings. This notion is rooted in the brand-
extension literature (Keller and Aaker 1992) and suggests that consumers’ perceptions of the 
brand should line up seamlessly with the perceptions of the dealer. This explains why extrinsic 
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dealer quality is important for prestige brands that revolve around status and why dealer price is 
important for economy brands with a strong price focus. The negative effect of the extrinsic 
quality of dealers selling economy brands on brand retention also illustrates the notion of brand-
dealer fit. Economy brand consumers perceive luxurious dealer showrooms as incompatible with 
low priced cars. They may even consider expensively fitted up showrooms a waste of money that 
raises the price they have to pay for a new car. This misfit lowers consumers’ dealer retention 
probabilities.  
 
Implications 
Our research has important implications for brand manufacturers and dealers. Most brand 
manufacturers strive for close relationships with dealers in order to improve dealer performance. 
Improvements in dealer performance are expected to lead to improvements in brand value and 
brand retention rates. Our findings suggest that only dealers of volume brands contribute to brand 
retention. Manufacturers of economy and prestige brands should not expect investments in, for 
example, dealer service quality and dealer showrooms, to lead to improved brand retention. 
These manufacturers should carefully inspect the expected returns from investments in dealers.  
Dealers of volume brands are capable of improving brand retention rates. Our simulation 
reveals however that the effect of brand-related variables on brand retention is much stronger 
than the effect of dealer-related variables. This means that in making trade-offs between 
investments in the brand or the dealer, the volume brand manufacturer should probably choose to 
invest in the brand in order to achieve higher retention rates. We are aware however that most 
manufacturers in the new car market find it increasingly difficult to achieve a distinct competitive 
advantage on brand-related attributes. Investments in dealers might be the only opportunity to 
establish a competitive advantage and improve brand retention rates. This is illustrated by 
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Jacques Nasser, former CEO of Ford, who claimed that: “Excellence in manufacturing, quality 
and productivity will no longer be enough. They are becoming standard within the industry” 
(Vandermerwe and Taishoff 2000). It is also important to emphasize that our study focuses on 
customer retention and not on the acquisition of new customers. An attractive dealer showroom 
helps, for example, to attract new customers.  
 Our results also have implications for dealers. Dealers of volume brands can use our 
findings to show manufacturers that they positively contribute to brand retention. In doing so, 
they gain more power in the channel. The power base of dealers of prestige and economy brands 
however is likely to diminish, because they fail to contribute to brand loyalty. From a 
manufacturer’s perspective they might seem to be exchangeable for other dealers and alternative 
outlets. These dealers simply function as a point of purchase that adds limited value to the brand. 
To avoid that manufacturers seek alternative outlets (e.g., supermarkets) to stimulate car sales, 
prestige and economy brand dealers have to rethink their strategic position within the channel.  
This is also important because manufacturers might consider selling cars to consumers 
themselves, either through manufacturer owned outlets or through the Internet, and leaving the 
service function to a reduced number of (new) specialized service points. To avoid lockout and 
disintermediation these dealers could consider selling and servicing multiple brands to enhance 
consumers’ dealer loyalty. Dealers of prestige and economy brands could also focus on selling 
and servicing multiple brands within a specific product category (e.g., convertibles) to provide 
additional value to consumers and ensure their position as channel intermediary. The recent 
success of car department stores in the UK highlights the relevance of this strategy (Edmonson 
2003c). Our findings also suggest that dealers of prestige and economy brands should pursue 
different strategies to ensure brand-dealer fit. Dealers of prestige brands should emphasize 
extrinsic quality and dealers of economy brands should stress their high levels of payment equity. 
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Dealers of brands such as Hyundai and Suzuki should, for example, not only emphasize their low 
maintenance and service costs, but also make sure that consumers’ perceptions of their 
showrooms is consistent with their brand’s high payment equity image. Thus they should have 
rather frenetic showrooms.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study is limited by several factors that should be addressed in future research. First, 
our sample is limited geographically. Our hypotheses should be tested further in other countries. 
Second, we collected our data after the repurchase decision. As a result the responses may be 
biased towards the actual decision. Ideally we would have liked to gather data on consumers’ 
perceptions about the brand- and dealer-related variables before the repurchase. However, as we 
interviewed consumers shortly after their repurchase decision, we believe that this bias should not 
be too problematic (cf. Punj and Brookes 2002). Third, we collected cross-sectional data. Future 
research could collect longitudinal perceptual data and longitudinal switching data. If these data 
are available consumer heterogeneity can explicitly be modeled using latent class and/or 
hierarchical Bayes type of models. Fourth, we did not include competitive data on brands and 
dealers in our study. The impact of competition might (partially) have been captured in 
consumers’ perceptions of the brand- and dealer-related variables. Moreover, most consumers are 
unlikely to be able to evaluate competitive brands and dealers, because they usually drive a single 
car for a number of years and have their car maintained and serviced at one dealer. Finally, the 
question is whether the results of this study can be generalized to other industries and markets. 
The most important finding of our research is that the dealer only ads marginal value to brand 
retention in a market dominated by brands (Sullivan 1998) and characterized by a distribution 
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structure in which dealers primarily sell a single brand. Dealers in other markets often sell 
multiple brands. If the contribution of dealers to brand retention is already marginal in a market 
with a selective and exclusive dealership structure, one might certainly question the contribution 
of dealers selling multiple brands. We believe that this is an important question for future 
research. Another important issue for future research on the impact of dealer value is that there 
might be asymmetric effects. When things are going well and there are no severe problems with 
the car, the dealer impact on brand retention is rather limited. However, once a source of 
dissatisfaction arises, it is plausible that a dealer takes a more prominent role, regardless of the 
brand type. Future research might address this issue by incorporating a moderating effect of 
recent critical car experiences. 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics (n=970) 
 
Sex: Age: Level of Education: 
- Male 55.8% - 18-29   3.9% - Academic education 37.8% 
- Female 44.2% - 30-39 14.6% - Vocational education 27.3% 
  - 40-49 20.8% - Secondary school 29.9% 
  - 50-59 29.7% - Primary school 5.0% 
  - 60-70 20.5%   
  - >70 10.5%   
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Table 2 
Results Confirmatory Factor Analysis Brand Variables (n=970) 
 
 
 
 
 
SE  
 
 
t-value  
Average 
extracted 
variance 
 
Composite 
reliability 
 
Coefficient 
alpha 
Intrinsic quality brand:      
- BIQ-1 0.86 26.97 0.63 0.84 0.82 
- BIQ-2 0.75 22.61    
- BIQ-3 0.77 23.45    
Extrinsic quality brand:      
- BEQ-1 0.72 21.48 0.45 0.88 0.88 
- BEQ-2 0.69 20.45    
- BEQ-3 0.59 16.76    
- BEQ-4 0.66 19.42    
- BEQ-5 0.66 19.18    
- BEQ-6 0.75 22.76    
- BEQ-7 0.69 20.42    
- BEQ-8 0.66 19.09    
- BEQ-9 0.60 16.99    
Brand payment equity:      
- BPE-1 0.58 13.39 0.48 0.74 0.71 
- BPE-2 0.66 18.12    
- BPE-3 0.81 22.68    
Brand trust:      
- BT-1 0.83 18.02 0.52 0.71 n.a. 
- BT-2 0.60 10.12    
Brand equity:      
- BE-1 0.68 18.69 0.46 0.74 0.70 
- BE-2 0.74 20.61    
- BE-3 0.61 13.37    
Brand switching costs:      
- BSC-1 0.90 11.07 0.66 0.79 n.a. 
- BSC-2 0.71 10.41    
Fit:  
χ2/df= 3.02; GFI=0.93; AGFI=0.91; NFI=0.91; NNFI=0.92; CFI=0.94; IFI=0.94; RMSEA=0.054 
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Table 3 
Results Confirmatory Factor Analysis Dealer Variables (n=970) 
 
 
 
 
 
SE  
 
 
t-value  
Average 
extracted 
variance 
 
Composite 
reliability 
 
Coefficient 
alpha 
Intrinsic quality dealer:      
- DIQ-1 0.77 19.16 0.68 0.89 0.88 
- DIQ-2 0.78 19.57    
- DIQ-3 0.86 22.57    
- DIQ-4 0.88 23.59    
Extrinsic quality dealer:      
- DEQ-1 0.73 18.08 0.62 0.92 0.92 
- DEQ-2 0.77 19.62    
- DEQ-3 0.80 20.60    
- DEQ-4 0.81 21.32    
- DEQ-5 0.76 19.25    
- DEQ-6 0.83 21.80    
- DEQ-7 0.81 20.87    
Dealer payment equity:      
- DPE-1 0.68 16.08 0.53 0.71 0.79 
- DPE-2 0.61 13.74    
- DPE-3 0.85 22.15    
- DPE-4 0.76 18.46    
Dealer trust:      
- DT-1 0.85 17.69 0.52 0.71 n.a. 
- DT-2 0.57 10.25    
Dealer switching costs:      
- DSC-1 0.69 18.62 0.63 0.81 n.a. 
- DSC-2 0.89 23.15    
Fit:  
χ2/df= 3.42; GFI=0.89; AGFI=0.87; NFI=0.91; NNFI=0.92; CFI=0.94; IFI=0.94; RMSEA=0.076 
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Table 4  
Correlation Matrix (n=970) 
 
 Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Intrinsic quality brand  4.23 0.73 1.00           
2. Extrinsic quality brand  4.14 0.52 0.54 1.00          
3. Brand payment equity 4.00 0.77 0.41 0.31 1.00         
4. Brand trust 4.21 0.87 0.46 0.33 0.43 1.00        
5. Brand equity 3.97 0.70 0.39 0.47 0.45 0.42 1.00       
6. Brand switching costs 2.46 1.35 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.20 1.00      
7. Intrinsic quality dealer  3.95 0.75 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.30 0.10 1.00     
8. Extrinsic quality dealer 4.07 0.77 0.44 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.14 0.57 1.00    
9. Dealer payment equity 3.64 0.86 0.36 0.30 0.44 0.37 0.36 0.18 0.43 0.62 1.00   
10. Dealer trust 3.95 1.02 0.29 0.23 0.27 0.38 0.23 0.09 0.35 0.61 0.54 1.00  
11. Dealer switching costs 2.30 1.32 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.20 0.71 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.09 1.00 
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Table 5: 
Estimation Results Nested Logit Model (n=922) 
 
Dealer Retention (Eq. 9) Brand Retention (Eq. 10) 
Variable Coefficient Estimate Variable Coefficient Estimate 
Constant β0 -2.54 c 
(1.46) 
Constant θ0 -5.97 a 
(0.87) 
DIQ*DPRB β1p -3.18 b 
(1.61) 
BIQ θ1 -0.15 
(0.14) 
DIQ*DVOB β1v 0.18  
(0.22) 
BEQ θ2 0.59 a 
(0.20) 
DIQ*DECB β1e 0.30 
(0.34) 
BPE θ2 0.26 b 
(0.12) 
DEQ*DPRB β2p 3.17 c 
(1.90) 
BE θ3 0.23 a 
(0.14) 
DEQ*DVOB β2v 0.18 
(0.22) 
BT θ4 0.43 a 
(0.11) 
DEQ*DECB β2e -0.97 a 
(1.71) 
BSC θ5 0.21 a 
(0.06) 
DPE*DPRB β3p -1.14 c 
(0.65) 
BPT θ6 0.58 a 
(0.18) 
DPE*DVOB β3v 0.34 c 
(0.18) 
DPRB θ7 0.18 
(0.81) 
DPE*DECB β3e 0.90 b 
(0.45) 
DVOB θ8 -0.41 
(0.52) 
DT β4 0.64 a 
(0.14) 
DV*DPRB τ0p -0.49 
(0.31) 
DSC β5 0.16 b 
(0.09) 
DV*DVOB τ0v 0.36 b 
(0.15) 
DPT β6 0.46 b 
(0.23) 
DV*DECB τ0e 0.16 
(0.29) 
DPRB β7 5.25 
(3.61) 
   
DVOB β8 -0.98 
(1.71) 
   
Model Statistics: 
Log Likelihood = -757.08; AIC = 1.70 
Notes: 
-Standard errors in parentheses below coefficient 
a p<0.01; b p<0.05; c p<0.10 
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Table 6: 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 
Hypothesis Description Result 
H1 The positive effect of dealer value on 
brand retention is larger for volume 
brands than for prestige brands and 
economy brands. 
Partial support: Contribution of dealer 
for volume brands is larger than 
contribution of dealer for prestige 
brands.  
H2 The positive effect of intrinsic dealer 
quality on dealer retention is (a) largest 
for economy brands and (b) smallest for 
prestige brands. 
No support for H3a. 
Support for H3b. 
H3 The positive effect of extrinsic dealer 
quality on dealer retention is (a) largest 
for prestige brands and (b) smallest for 
economy brands. 
Support for H4a on 0.06 significance 
level. 
Support for H4b. 
H4 The positive effect of dealer payment 
equity on dealer retention is (a) largest for 
economy brands and (b) smallest for 
prestige brands. 
No support for H5a. 
Support for H5b. 
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Figure 1: 
Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2: 
Simulation Effect of Brand Payment Equity and Brand Trust, Dealer Payment Equity, Dealer 
Trust on Brand Retention Probability 
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APPENDIX A 
Intrinsic brand quality (anchored 1= very poor and 5= very good): 
- BIQ-1 Quality 
- BIQ-2 Durability 
- BIQ-3 Reliability 
Extrinsic brand quality (anchored 1= very poor and 5= very good): 
- BEQ-1 Functionality 
- BEQ-2 Engine power 
- BEQ-3 Comfort 
- BEQ-4 Ease of use 
- BEQ-5 Space 
- BEQ-6 Safety 
- BEQ-7 Design 
- BEQ-8 Emanation 
- BEQ-9 Model variety 
- BEQ-10 Trimmings** 
- BEQ-11 Interior* 
Brand payment equity (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- BPE-1 My [brand] was reasonably priced 
- BPE-2 The quality/price ratio of [brand] is good 
- BPE-3 [brand] gives me my money’s worth 
- BPE-4 The price of my [brand] was too high** 
Brand equity (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- BE-1 [brand] is a strong brand 
- BE-2 [brand] is a well-known brand 
- BE-3 [brand] is an attractive brand** 
- BE-4 [brand] is a unique brand 
Brand trust (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- BT-1 I trust [brand] 
- BT-2 I rely on [brand] 
Brand switching cost (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- BSC-1 It is difficult to switch between car brands 
- BSC-2 It is troublesome to switch between car brands 
Note:   
 *     Deleted during initial item purification  
 **   Deleted during further item purification  
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APPENDIX (cont’d) 
Intrinsic dealer quality (anchored 1= very poor and 5= very good): 
- DIQ-1 Standing by agreements  
- DIQ-2 Quality of maintenance 
- DIQ-3 Quality of repairs 
- DIQ-4 Quality of explanations with repairs  
- DIQ-5 Quality of explanations with maintenance  
- DIQ-6 Quality of communications 
- DIQ-7 Ability to do things first time right 
- DIQ-8 Craftsmanship* 
- DIQ-9 Willingness to help you* 
- DIQ-10 Speed with which you are being served** 
- DIQ-11 Personal attention that you receive* 
Extrinsic dealer quality (anchored 1= very poor and 5= very good): 
- DEQ-1 Lay-out of the workshop 
- DEQ-2 Atmosphere in the workshop 
- DEQ-3 Lay-out of the showroom 
- DEQ-4 Emanation of the showroom 
- DEQ-5 Atmosphere in the showroom* 
Dealer payment equity (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- DPE-1 Repairs at [dealer] are costly 
- DPE-2 [dealer] gave me a good trade-in value for my old car  
- DPE-3 [dealer] gives me my money’s worth 
- DPE-4 The quality/price ratio with [dealer] is good 
- DPE-5 I think I paid too much for my [brand] at [dealer]* 
- DPE-6 [dealer] got more out of the deal than I did** 
- DPE-7 The maintenance costs at [dealer] are too high* 
Dealer trust (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- DT-1 I trust [dealer] 
- DT-2 I rely on [dealer] 
Dealer switching costs (anchored 1= very strongly disagree and 5= very strongly agree): 
- DSC-1 It is difficult to switch between dealers 
- DSC-2 It is troublesome to switch between dealers 
Note:   
 *     Deleted during initial item purification  
 **   Deleted during further item purification  
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Appendix B  
 Economy 
brand 
Volume 
brand 
Prestige 
brand 
 
Total 
# of interjudge 
agreements 
- Alfa Romeo 2 14  46  62 1046  
- Audi 2 8  52  62 1337  
- BMW 0 4  58  62 1680  
- Chrysler 1 22  38  62 720  
- Citroen 7 48  7  62 1116  
- Daewoo 39 20  3  62 749  
- Daihatsu 46 12  4  62 1032  
- Fait 23 38  1  62 715  
- Ford 9 50  4  62 1205  
- Honda 10 41  11  62 834  
- Hyundai 40 20  2  62 763  
- Kia 41 17  5  62 803  
- Lancia 16 12  34  62 550  
- Mazda 11 40  10  62 787  
- Mercedes 3 1  58  62 1644  
- Mitsubishi 16 44  2  62 947  
- Nissan 23 37  2  62 651  
- Opel 10 40  11  62 787  
- Peugeot 2 48  11  62 1145  
- Renault 7 48  6  62 1145  
- Rover 2 14  46  62 1034  
- Seat 31 26  5  62 465  
- Skoda 46 11  5  62 1032  
- Subaru 34 19  8  62 577  
- Suzuki 47 13  2  62 1058  
- Toyota 6 45  11  62 980  
- Volkswagen 1 37  24  62 667  
- Volvo 1 10  51  62 1280  
       
- Total: 477  740  519  1736 26748  
Note: 
- Proportion of interjudge agreement = 26748 / ((28*62*61)/2)=0.51 
- PRL-reliability = 0.99 (Rust and Cooil 1994, p.8) 
   
 
 
 
 
 42
References 
Aaker, David A. (1994), “Building a Brand: The Saturn Story,” California Management Review, 
36 (2), 114-133 
----- and Keller, Kevin Lane (1990), “Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions,” Journal of 
Marketing, 54 (1), 27-42 
Anderson, James C. and James A. Narus (1995), “Capturing the Value of Supplementary 
Services,” Harvard Business Review, 73 (1), 75-84 
Anderson, Erin and Barton Weitz (1992), “The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain 
Commitment,” Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (1), 18-34  
Anderson, Eugene W. and Mary W. Sullivan (1993), “The Antecedents and Consequences of 
Customer Satisfaction for Firms,” Marketing Science, 12 (2), 125-144  
Autopolis (2000), The Natural Link between Sales and Service: An Investigation for the 
Competition Directorate General of the European Commission, available at http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm./competition/car_sector  
Babin, Barry J., W.R. Darden and M. Griffin (1994), “Work and Fun – Measuring Hedonic and 
Utilitarian Shopping Value,” Journal of Consumer Research, 20 (4), 644-656 
Bagozzi, Richard P. and Youjae Yi (1988), “On the Evaluation of Structural Equation Models,” 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16 (1), 74-94 
-----, ----- and Lynn W. Phillips (1991), “Assessing Construct Validity in Organizational 
Research,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (3), 421-458 
Bagwell, Laurie S. and B. Doughlas Bernheim (1996), “Veblen Effects in a Theory of 
Conspicuous Consumption,” The American Economic Review, 86 (3), 349-374 
Ben-Akiva, Moshe and S.R. Lerman (1985), Discrete Choice Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
 43
Press 
Blattberg, Robert C. and Scott A. Neslin (1990), Sales Promotion, Concepts, Methods, and 
Strategies. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey  
Bolton, Ruth N. (1998),  “A Dynamic Model of the Duration of the Consumer’s Relationship 
with a Continuous Service Provider: The Role of Satisfaction,” Marketing Science, 17 (1), 
45-65 
----- P. K. Kannan and Matthew D. Bramlett (2000), “Implications of Loyalty Program 
Membership and Service Experiences for Customer Retention and Value,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 28 (1), 95-108 
----- and Katherine N. Lemon (1999), “A Dynamic Model of Consumers' Usage of Services: 
Usage as an Antecedent and Consequence of Satisfaction,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
36 (2), 171-86 
-----, ----- and Peter C. Verhoef (2004), “The Theoretical Underpinnings of Customer Asset 
Management: A Framework and Propositions for Future Research,” Journal of the Academy 
of Marketing Science, 32 (3), 271-293 
Braun, Ottmar L. and Robert A. Wicklund (1989), “Psychological Antecedents of Conspicuous 
Consumption,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 10 (2), 161-188 
Browne, M.W. and R. Cudeck (1993), “Alternative Ways of Assessing Model Fit”. In: Bollen, 
Kenneth A. and J. Scott Long (eds.): Testing Structural Equation Models, Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage Publications, 136-162 
Bucklin, Randolph E. and James M. Lattin (1991), “A Two-State Model of Purchase Incidence 
and Brand Choice,” Marketing Science, 10 (1), 24-39 
------ and Sunil Gupta (1992), “Brand Choice, Purchase Incidence, and Segmentation: An 
 44
Integrated Modeling Approach,” Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (2), 201-216 
Campo, Katia, Els Gijsbrechts and Patricia Nisol (2000), “Towards Understanding Consumer 
Response to Stock-Outs,” Journal of Retailing, 76 (Summer), 219-42 
Chaudhuri, Arjun and Morris B. Holbrook (2001), “The Chain of Effects from Brand Trust and 
Brand Affect to Brand Performance: The Role of Brand Loyalty,” Journal of Marketing, 65 
(2), 81-93 
Chu, Wujin and Preyas S. Desai (1995), “Channel Coordination Mechanisms for Consumer 
Satisfaction,” Marketing Science, 14 (4), 343-359 
Compeau Larry D., Dhruv Grewal and Kent B. Monroe (1998), “Role of Prior Affect and 
Sensory Cues on Consumers’ Affective and Cognitive Responses and Overall Perceptions 
of Quality,” Journal of Business Research, 42 (3), 295-308. 
Coughlan, Anne T., Erin Anderson, Louis W. Stern and Adel I. El-Ansary (2001), Marketing 
Channels, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River New Jersey  
Crosby, Lawrence A. and Nancy Stephens (1987), “Effects of Relationship Marketing on 
Satisfaction, Retention, and Prices in the Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 24 (4), 404-412 
Desarbo, Wayne and Ajay K. Manrai (1992), “A New Multidimensional Scaling Methodology 
for the Analysis of Asymmetric Proximity Data in Marketing Research,” Marketing 
Science, 11 (1), 1-20 
DeWulf, Kristof, Gaby Odekerken-Schröder and Dawn Iacobucci (2001), “Investments in 
Consumer Relationships: A Cross-Country and Cross-Industry Exploration,” Journal of 
Marketing, 65 (4), 33-50 
 45
Edmonson, Gail (2003a), “VW Needs a Jump,” Business Week, May 12, 14-15 
----- (2003b), “BMW,” Business Week, June 19, 19-24 
----- (2003c), “Porsches? Aisle 7,” Business Week, July 28, 22 
Fites, Donald V. (1996), “Make your Dealers your Partners,” Harvard Business Review, 74 (2), 
84-96 
Fournier, Susan (1998), “Consumers and their Brands: Developing Relationship Theory in 
Consumer Research,” Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (4), 343-374 
Franses, Philip Hans and Richard Paap (2001), Quantitative Marketing Models, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
Garbarino, Ellen and Mark S. Johnson (1999), “The Different Roles of Satisfaction, Trust and 
Commitment in Consumer Relationships,” Journal of Marketing, 63 (2), 70-87 
Gerbing, David W. and James C. Anderson (1992), “Monte Carlo Evaluations of Goodness of Fit 
Indexes for Structural Equation Models,” Sociological Methods and Research, 21 
(November), 132-160. 
Greene, William H. (1997), Econometric Analysis, Upper Saddle River, Prentice Hall 
Guadagni, Peter M. and John D.C. Little (1983), “A Logit Model of Brand Choice Calibrated on 
Scanner Data,” Marketing Science, 2 (3), 203-238 
Jöreskog, Karl G. and Dag Sörbom (1993), LISREL 8: Structural Equation Modeling with the 
SIMPLIS Command Language. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale New Jersey 
Keller, Kevin Lane (1993), “Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Consumer-Based Brand 
Equity,” Journal of Marketing, 57 (January), 1-22.  
----- (1998), Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, 
Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall.  
----- and David A. Aaker (1992), “The Effects of Sequential Introduction of Brand Extensions,” 
 46
Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (1), 35-51 
Kirmani, Amna, Sanjay Sood and Sheri Bridges (1999), “The Ownership Effect in Consumer 
Responses to Brand Line Stretches,” Journal of Marketing, 63 (1), 88-102 
Kumar, Nirmayala, Lisa K. Scheer and Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp (1995), “The Effects of 
Supplier Fairness on Vulnerable Resellers,” Journal of Marketing Research, 32 (1), 54-65 
Lichtenstein, Donald R. and Oliver W. Bearden (1989), “Contextual Influences on Perceptions of 
Merchant-Supplied Reference Prices,” Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (1), 55-65 
Maddox, R. Neil (1982), “The Structure of Consumers’ Product Satisfaction: Comparison Across 
Products,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 10 (1), 37-53 
Marsh, H.W. and D. Hovecar (1985), “Application of Confirmatory Factor Analysis to the Study 
of Self-Concept: First and Higher Order Factor Models and their Invariance across 
Groups,” Psychological Bulletin, 97 (3), 562-582 
McFadden, Daniel (1981), “Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice”. In: Manski, C. and D. 
McFadden (eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press  
Mittal, Vikas and Wagner A. Kamakura (2001), “Satisfaction, Repurchase Intent, and 
Repurchase Behavior: Investigating the Moderating Effect of Consumer Characteristics,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 38 (1), 131-42 
----, Pankai Kumar and Michael Tsiros (1999), “Attribute-Level Performance, Satisfaction and 
Behavioral Intentions Over Time: A Consumption System Approach,” Journal of 
Marketing, 63 (2), 88-101  
Morgan, Robert M. and Hunt, Shelby D. (1994), “The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing,” Journal of Marketing, 58 (3), 20-38  
Nunnally, Jim C. (1978), Psychometric Theory, 2nd ed. MacMillan, New York 
Oliver, Rick L. and John E. Swan (1989), “Equity and Disconfirmation Perceptions as Influences 
 47
on Merchant and Product Satisfaction,” Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (3), 372-383 
----- and Russel S. Winer (1987), “A Framework for the Formation and Structure of Consumer 
Expectations: Review and Propositions,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 8 (4), 469-500  
Parasuraman A., Valarie A. Zeithaml and Leonard L. Berry (1985), “A Conceptual Model of 
Service Quality and its Implications for Future Research,” Journal of Marketing, 49 (4), 41-
51 
Park, C. Whan, Sandra Milberg, Robert Lawson (1991), “Evaluation of Brand Extensions: The 
Role of Product Feature,” Journal of Consumer Research, 18 (2), 185-194 
Punj, Girish and Richard Brookes (2002), “The Influence of Pre-decisional Constraints on 
Information Search and Consideration Set Formation in New Automobile Purchases,” 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 19 (4), 383-400 
Ratchford, Brian T., Myung-Soo Lee and Debabrata Talukdar (2003), “The Impact of the Internet 
on Information Search for Automobiles,” Journal of Marketing Research, 40 (2), 193-209 
Rust, Roland T. and Bruce Cooil (1994), “Reliability Measures for Qualitative Data: Theory and 
Implications,” Journal of Marketing Research, 31 (1), 1-14 
-------, Katherine N Lemon and Valarie A. Zeithaml (2004), “Return on Marketing: Using 
Customer Equity to Focus Marketing Strategy,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (1), 109-127 
Sirohi, Niren, Edward W. McLaughlin and Dick R. Wittink (1999), “A Model of Consumer 
Perceptions and Store Loyalty Intentions for a Supermarket Retailer,” Journal of 
Retailing, 74 (2), 223-246 
Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict E.M. and Hans C.M. Van Trijp (1991), “The Use of LISREL in 
Validating Marketing Constructs,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 8 (4), 
283-299  
Srinivasan, Narasimhan, Subhash C. Jain and Kiranjit Sikand (2004), “An Experimental Study of 
 48
Two Dimensions of Country-of-Origin (Manufacturing Country and Branding Country) 
using Intrinsic and Extrinsic Cues,” International Business Review, 13 (1),65-82. 
Sullivan, Mary W. (1998), “How Brand Names Affect the Demand of Twin Automobiles,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 35 (May), 154-165 
Tauber, Edward M. (1988), “Brand Leverage: Strategy For Growth In A Cost-Control World,”  
Journal of Advertising Research, 28 (4), 26-31 
Vandermerwe, Sandra and Taishoff, Marika (2000), Ford Motor Company: Using Web-
Strategies to Drive Customer Relationship Management, Case Study The Management 
School Imperial College, London (ECCH 500-029-1) 
Verhoef, Peter C. (2003), “Understanding the Effect of Customer Relationship Management 
Efforts on Customer Retention and Customer Share Development,” Journal of Marketing, 
67 (4), 30-45. 
-----, Philip Hans Franses and Janny C. Hoekstra (2001), “The Effect of Satisfaction and Payment 
Equity on Cross-Buying for a Multi-Service Provider,” Journal of Retailing, 77 (3), 359-
378 
Yin Lam, Shun, Venkatesh Shankar, M. Krishna Erramilli and Bvsan Mruth (2004), “Customer 
Value, Satisfaction, Loyalty and Switching Costs: An Illustration from a Business-to-
Business Service Context,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, forthcoming 
Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1988), “Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means End 
Model and Synthesis of Evidence,” Journal of Marketing, 52 (3), 2-22 
-------, Leonard L. Berry and A. Parasuraman (1996), “The Behavioral Consequences of Service 
Quality,” Journal of Marketing, 60 (2), 31-46 
  
 
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Marketing” 
 
2004 
 
Account Managers Creation of Social Capital: Communal and Instrumental Investments and Performance Implications 
Willem Verbeke, Frank Belschak, Stefan Wuyts and Richard P. Bagozzi    
ERS-2004-011-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1166 
 
The Adaptive Consequences of Pride in Personal Selling 
Willem Verbeke, Frank Belschak and Richard P. Bagozzi 
ERS-2004-012-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1167 
 
Coping with Sales Call Anxiety and Its Effects on Protective Actions  
Frank Belschak, Willem Verbeke and Richard P. Bagozzi  
ERS-2004-013-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1172 
 
On The Predictive Content Of Production Surveys: A Pan-European Study 
Aurélie Lemmens, Christophe Croux and Marnik G. Dekimpe 
ERS-2004-017-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1175 
 
Advertising effects on awareness, consideration and brand choice using tracking data 
Philip Hans Franses and Marco Vriens 
ERS-2004-028-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1266 
 
How To Seize a Window of Opportunity: The Entry Strategy of Retail Firms into Transition Economies 
Katrijn Gielens and Marnik G. Dekimpe 
ERS-2004-038-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1581 
 
Channel power in multi-channel environments 
Sonja Gensler, Marnik G. Dekimpe & Bernd Skiera 
ERS-2004-041-MKT 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1334 
 
Understanding Brand and Dealer Retention in the New Car Market: The Moderating Role of Brand Type 
P.C. Verhoef, F. Langerak and B. Donkers 
ERS-2004-084-MKT 
                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
